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The future of European organizations and corporations 
is interlinked with the ability of Europe’s policymakers to 
create the environment for innovation to flourish.
Innovation is key to long-term growth. It 
has been a priority for European policy-
makers since the Lisbon strategy was 
launched in 2000, and a number of EU 
initiatives have been developed over the 
past decade. However, now is the time 
to take a fresh look at a dynamic and 
renewed policy to drive innovation. Why? 
Because profound social and economic 
shifts, such as the rising economic 
power of the emerging markets and an 
aging population in many developed 
markets, demand a new, more 
competitive approach. 
In order to generate growth and 
prosperity, Europe needs a policy that 
is market driven and firmly supports 
an environment of innovation, and 
transforms these new ideas into new 
businesses and new solutions. 
Together with the Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS), a renowned 
think tank based in Brussels, we have 
undertaken a study among industry 
experts that focuses on EU innovation 
initiatives and identifies changes that 
would lead to more responsive and 
dynamic innovation policy. 
Our report asks, what would this policy 
look like? What needs to be changed for 
policy to be more effective and create 
growth? How can innovation policy 
better consider industry needs and 
evolving market trends at a very early 
stage of formulation? 
Understanding the causes of the current 
“innovation gap” in Europe is the first 
step toward finding an acceptable 
solution. But, because markets and 
technologies constantly evolve, it 
makes little sense to look at only the 
economy of today. Governments also 
need to strengthen their engagement 
with and understanding of future 
market developments. This can be 
achieved through continued dialogue 
with European companies to understand 
the rapid changes that are occurring 
in the markets of tomorrow, and the 
competitive position that European 
organizations must maintain to meet 
future industry and consumer needs. 
The future of European organizations 
and corporations is interlinked with 
the ability of Europe’s policymakers to 
create the environment for innovation to 
flourish. We look forward to participating 
in the discussion.
Further information can be found at 
www.ey.com/government-innovation.
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Executive summary: Towards smart,  
sustainable and inclusive innovation
This report demonstrates that innovation policy around the 
world is becoming increasingly complex, and such complexity is 
even more visible in a multi-level government framework such as 
the European Union. 
However, it would be unfair to state that the European Union 
– and in particular the European Commission – have paid 
insufficient attention to the problem of the “innovation gap” 
between the EU and other regions of the world. The proliferation 
of initiatives in support of innovation has been breathtaking in 
the past decade, but notwithstanding the efforts devoted at EU 
and national level, EU competitiveness in the global economy 
is falling backwards, with the US and Japan consolidating their 
lead, and BRIC countries quickly catching up.
As we state in this report, an analysis of the emerging trends in 
markets and industries shows that a well-conceived innovation 
strategy must use a broader set of tools compared to what has 
traditionally been the domain of innovation policy. Specifically: 
• Some of the existing tools must be revised, including: 
(i) financial instruments to support innovative SMEs; 
(ii) public-private partnerships for the deployment 
of infrastructure and other enabling products and 
services; (iii) university-industry technology transfer 
schemes that aim to foster the commercialization and 
marketability of the results of research that takes place 
in European Centers of Excellence; and (iv) a pan-
European strategy to promote the development of new 
skills for new jobs. 
• New tools have to be conceived and implemented. 
This is the case of (i) permanent platforms for 
early-stage and ongoing industry consultation; 
(ii) demand-side policies, especially relate to the 
use of public procurement to created demand for 
innovative products; (iii) the creation of “innovation 
ecosystems”, or platforms dedicated to facilitating the 
cooperation between different players along the value 
chain, including intermediaries and Open Innovation 
Accelerators; (iv) the full exploitation of European 
excellence by promoting the creation of pan-European 
clusters, connected with related clusters and industries 
in other regions of the world.
• Innovation policy should be better coordinated 
between the EU and the national level. Our analysis 
revealed the need to centralize EU innovation policy 
in a number of domains in which the minimum scale 
of innovation incentives is too large for mere national 
policy. A thorough subsidiarity test is needed to identify 
the areas in which the existing fragmentation of national 
innovation policies is hampering EU competitiveness 
and growth. (Subsidiarity is a principle of EU law that 
states that EU may only act where action of individual 
countries is insufficient.) 
The results of our survey of industry experts confirmed the 
need for an “innovative innovation policy.” This report aims to 
kick-start this debate by illustrating a number of avenues for 
reform. When coupled with adequate regulatory reform and 
simplification of investment-related legislation, these proposals 
show the potential to bring Europe back on track in the quest 
for international competitiveness. Countries such as the US and 
Japan are already leading the way towards these developments 
and it is partly reassuring that the European Commission, 
despite its limited powers, seems to understand the imperative 
to move in the direction of a more coordinated, dynamic and 
technology-neutral innovation policy as the only chance for 
Europe to achieve the long-term targets set by the EU 2020 
Agenda. 
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Introduction:  
why is innovation so important?
All around the world, governments are looking for opportunities 
to foster economic recovery in the aftermath of one of the 
deepest economic crises of modern times. Everywhere, 
innovation is evoked as the main avenue for achieving 
economic growth and competitiveness. For example, in his 
2011 State of Union Address, US President Barack Obama 
warned of a “Sputnik moment” in calling for the US to confront 
international economic competitiveness and innovation policy 
challenges. Similarly, European Commission President Jose 
Manuel Barroso stressed the need to speed-up investment in 
future prosperity through new sources of growth, in particular 
by “supporting business and investing in the growth industries of 
the future like green energy, innovative start-ups and advanced 
manufacturing.” Throughout the European Union, awareness 
of the need to shift gear to regain competitiveness is mounting: 
heads of large states such as the chancellor of Germany Angela 
Merkel and the French president Nicolas Sarkozy have recently 
called for boosting economic recovery, especially through energy 
policy and innovation. 
This should come as no surprise: economic theory is unanimous 
in concluding that technological innovation is a key contributor 
to long-term well-being. Innovation improves well-being and 
benefits future generations in several ways: biological innovation 
mitigates disease and hunger and thus contributes directly to 
health; innovation in communications and the organization 
of information fosters educational, political, and social 
development; innovation in smart grids leads to more efficient 
and sustainable energy consumption, and so on. And most 
importantly, innovation is the engine of economic growth, which 
is central to increasing well-being, particularly to the extent 
that the fruits of this economic growth flow in some measure to 
the least well-off. More specifically, innovation fuels economic 
growth by creating new markets and reaching new productivity 
levels: to quote Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman, “productivity 
isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything.”1  
At the same time, innovation is a very difficult subject for 
public policy: it is at once a pervasive and elusive subject. 
It is pervasive since it entails both government and private 
investment; it is pervasive since it permeates all areas of 
public policy, from tax to labor, from telecoms to energy, from 
competition to industrial policy, from education to intellectual 
property, from immigration to health and agriculture, from 
supply-side to demand-side policies; and also, because it requires 
actions at the global, EU, national, regional and local level. At 
the same time, innovation is a very elusive subject because it 
is hard to define (if not as “the process by which individuals 
and organizations generate new ideas and put them into 
practice”); and also because there is no easy mix, no one-size-
fits all solution to unleash the potential of innovation in a given 
country: as will be argued in more detail below, when it comes to 
innovation policy, quality is as important as quantity, and control 
as important as speed. This is why every government wants 
innovation, but no government can be sure of how to boost its 
full potential. 
This first Government and Innovation Report from Ernst & 
Young, in collaboration with the Centre for European Policy 
Studies, CEPS, will demonstrate that the greatest difficulty 
in innovation policy is anticipating current developments 
and crafting forward-looking policy actions that will not be 
obsolete when they finally enter into force. This is a tough 
challenge, especially in the EU where multi-level governance 
often significantly slows down the policy process. And it becomes 
tougher every day: looking at current developments, we see 
innovation accelerating, going “global” and becoming more 
“open”. At the same time, it requires more sophisticated skills, 
more global collaboration between public and private players, 
and a more constant monitoring of societal needs. 
We will discuss the state of innovation in Europe from a global 
perspective, as well as the evolving features of innovation in the 
globalized world. We examine EU innovation policy, especially 
in light of the current policy debate on the “Innovation Union” 
flagship initiative recently launched within the new EU 2020 
agenda of the European Union. And we discuss the results of 
our survey of industry experts and propose a number of policy 
recommendations that, in our opinion, would contribute to 
boosting EU competitiveness in the years to come, casting new 
light on the future directions that innovation policy might take to 
ensure economic recovery and a better business environment in 
the EU.  
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larger lags, smaller leads
Over the past two decades, the gap between Europe and other 
regions of the world in terms of growth and competitiveness 
has been constantly widening. Recent data published by the 
European Commission in the “Innovation Union Scoreboard 
2010” confirmed this trend, showing that the United States 
and Japan are far ahead of EU member states along several 
dimensions of innovation. At the same time countries that used 
to lag behind, such as the BRIC economies, are quickly catching 
up and seem likely to overtake the EU in the next few years. 
This is not simply a sign of decadence in Europe, but also a very 
undesirable development in terms of sustainable development 
and, overall, of the progress and prosperity that will be enjoyed 
by European citizens and businesses in the years to come. Even 
more importantly, EU efforts in the direction of encouraging 
innovation, growth and productivity in member states have 
so far failed to prevent the emergence of a remarkable 
fragmentation in the innovation performance of the 27 
member states of EU. 
In its report on “The World in 2025”, the European Commission 
forecasted that “if the recent trends continue, in 2025, 
the United States and Europe will have lost their scientific 
and technological supremacy for the benefit of Asia.”2 In 
particular, the US and EU will lose their primacy in terms of 
R&D investments, with India and China providing 20% of the 
world’s R&D. In 2014, China will overtake the EU in terms of R&D 
spending (see figure 2). 
Figure 1 
Research and innovation performance: US, China and Japan 
innovation performance in 2006 and 2010
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The values in the graphs shows the relative performance compared with 
EU27. E.g. the US in 2010 is performing 49% better within key areas such as 
economic effects, f.ex. exports, licenses and patent revenues, than the EU27 
and China is performing 55% worse than the EU27 in 201029.
Figure 2
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Specific indicators: education
The picture becomes even less reassuring for Europe if one 
observes the evolution of key indicators of future innovation, 
such as the trends in university education and patented 
inventions. For example, while the EU has almost 40% of the 
universities in the top 500 of the Shanghai ranking, the top end 
is clearly dominated by the US (17 of the top 20 institutions are 
located in the US). Total spending on tertiary education in the 
EU (as a % of GDP) is less than half the US level, mainly as a 
result of lower private spending in Europe. For example, while 
it is estimated that 645,000 Chinese students and 300,000 
Indian students will study abroad in 2025; at the same time, 
the number of EU citizens studying abroad is likely to remain far 
more limited. Today in the EU, one person in three aged 25–34 
has completed a university degree, compared with more than 
50% in Japan and 40% in the US3.  
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Specific indicators: patents 
On average, European countries lag behind the US and other 
regions of the world in terms of number of patents as well as in 
license and patent revenues.4 The limited ability of European 
countries to generate innovation for future prosperity is 
dramatically visible in available data on patented technologies 
that aim at matching future needs of our ageing and 
environmentally unstable society. As shown in figure 3 below, 
health-related patents are largely dominated by the United 
States, whereas Japan has taken the lead on climate-friendly 
technologies. As these technologies are projected to grow in 
importance over time, Europe’s competitive position is likely to 
become even weaker in the decades to come. This also means 
that, while Europe has taken the lead in proposing ambitious 
emission reduction targets, the technologies that Europe and 
other regions of the world will employ to achieve these target 
will not be European. 
Figure 3 
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Private R&D spending
Besides education and patent trends, Europe’s weakest link 
in the complex chain that contributes to innovation is private 
spending in R&D. Although Europe, the US, Japan and China 
all feature similar levels of public R&D spending on GDP, where 
the difference becomes enormous is in private spending. The 
latter is so high that in the US Google alone spends 70% more 
on R&D for information and communication technology, ICT, 
than what the whole EU spent for ICT in its Seventh Framework 
Program for Research (FP7) – approximately €2 billion versus 
€1.3 billion. Why is this? In Europe, several obstacles seem to 
hamper private R&D spending. Europe features a lack of mature 
venture capital markets, a very fragmented legal landscape for 
the development of pan-cross-border investment; a lack of scale 
and minimum size for innovative ventures; high levels of taxation 
and difficulties in hiring the best talents; never-ending problems 
in filing patent claims; and many others. 
Likewise, the legal uncertainty that surrounds technology and 
knowledge transfer between university and industry has led 
Europe to a situation in which basic research still competes, 
in many traditional sectors, with other regions of the world. 
However, in terms of bringing innovative products to market, 
Europe compares poorly when compared to its global 
competitors.  
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Available data shows that around the world, it is mostly small 
companies and young, leading innovators (so-called “yollies”) 
that contribute to growth and innovation through their talent 
and risk-loving attitude, which makes them “move“ the market 
economy. Unfortunately, in this respect Europe also seems to 
perform quite badly compared with other regions of the world. 
US yollies contribute almost 40% of the R&D expenditure and 
sales of the top 1,400 R&D investing firms worldwide, while 
EU ones only contribute approximately 7%.5
Figure 4
R&D intensitiy and Yollies, EU vs. US 
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Following these tendencies Europe, absent a massive effort of 
both public and private players, risks being simply wiped away 
from the “innovation map.” 
Figure 5
Performance lead US, EU vs. US – key indicators 
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The figure shows the US performance lead. For example, US is performing 
better than the EU in terms of “new doctorate degrees” by 14% and in terms 
of “licence and patent revenues” by 222%.
Source: European Commission (2011)
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EU innovation: past mistakes,  
current prospects
The EU innovation gap has a multitude of concurring causes, 
most of which have been extensively studied and highlighted in 
the literature, as well as in official documents released by the EU 
and other institutions.6 The level of public support to R&D and 
innovation investments does not seem to be the real issue. It is 
not the quantity of public funding of R&D and innovation, but 
rather its quality that hampers EU’s economic recovery.  
As a matter of fact, over the past few years there has been no 
shortage of initiatives on innovation policy in Europe. After 
a decade dominated by the Lisbon Agenda, the Framework 
Programs for research, the 2001–2005 Multi-Annual Program 
for SMEs, the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Program (CIP), the use of structural and cohesion funds, the 
i2010 and several other initiatives, EU institutions have realized 
that the ambitious goals set in 2000 had not been reached, 
and decided to put innovation even more at the forefront of EU 
policies for the years to come. 
This undesirable result can be seen as a combination of several 
factors. 
• First, responsibility for innovation policy is badly distributed 
between Brussels and national capitals. In several key sectors 
in which innovation policy would require a coordinated and 
even harmonized approach at the EU level (such as cluster 
policy or targeted policies that stimulate venture capital and 
R&D investment), national governments still retain their 
prerogatives.  
• Second, regional policy funded by the EU budget has been 
insufficiently geared towards innovation, and coordination 
of this policy with mainstream research and innovation policy 
in the European Commission has remained loose at best. 
One must add to this that the governance of regional policy, 
especially in terms of member states’ reporting of the way in 
which regional funds are spent, has been rather poor in the 
past years.  
• Third, even within the European Commission, several 
Directorates General, DGs, and sub-offices have been 
sharing policy portfolios linked to innovation policy: in 
particular, DG Enterprise and Industry has held responsibility 
for actions in support of SMEs and entrepreneurship (such 
as the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Program, 
CIP); DG Research has retained responsibility for the funding 
of research up to the commercialization of innovation; DG 
Internal Market still manages the policy portfolio on intellectual 
property protection such as patent and copyright law of the 
European Union; DG Competition is responsible for state aids 
and the rules on technology ventures such as patent pools and 
other forms of R&D collaboration. 
• Fourth, a similar fragmentation was reflected also in 
the availability of budget instruments for the funding of 
innovation. There are so many different programs for the 
funding of innovation that companies wishing to receive 
funding may have problems in realizing where to go and 
for which line of budget to apply. This overlap of budget 
instruments, managed by different units and sometimes 
different EU institutions, leads to sub-additively – i.e. the total 
is worth less than the sum of individual components. 
Recently, with the second Barroso Commission, these problems 
were addressed through attempts to centralize innovation policy 
in the hands of a new Directorate General (DG) for Research, 
Innovation and Science, chaired by Commissioner Máire 
Geoghegan-Quinn. The new DG will face major challenges. For 
example, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, which wiped 
away a decade of economic growth, the EU has given itself 
even more ambitious goals compared with the Lisbon ones. 
The EU2020 strategy aims to reach unprecedented levels of 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, putting Europe in the 
driver’s seat in the race for global competitiveness. But even if 
the new DG will to some extent, solve the problem of excessively 
fragmented competences within the European Commission – 
which is not guaranteed, given that DG Enterprise is maintaining 
its control on entrepreneurship and innovation – the problem 
of streamlining governance between the Commission and 
other EU institutions, as well as the need to efficiently allocate 
competences between the EU and national governments, 
will remain. In other words, getting governance right in the 
Commission is important, but only means fixing a piece of a 
much bigger puzzle.
Moreover, the new EU2020 strategy has been endowed with a 
dedicated flagship initiative (“Innovation Union”), accompanied 
by other innovation-related initiatives, such as “Digital Agenda”, 
“An Industrial Policy for the Globalization Era,” and “An Agenda 
for New Skills and Jobs”. This is leading to a new generation of 
even more ambitious policies, which seem likely to lead to an 
increase in the already egregious levels of public spending, and 
at the same time appear constrained, if not frustrated, by the 
lack of EU competence on issues that still pertain to national 
governments. 
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EU innovation: past mistakes,  
current prospects
The successor to the Competitiveness and Innovation Program, 
the renewed Entrepreneurship and Innovation Program (EIP), 
will serve as another cross-cutting instrument aimed at boosting 
entrepreneurship and innovation in Europe. Addressing as many 
as 11 different components, the EIP will focus on cluster policy 
and emerging industries, public procurement and many more 
issues. A carefully targeted initative, this is not. 
Although the Commission’s commitment is undisputed, it 
remains to be seen whether in this case, once more, a “wealth of 
information” will create a “poverty of attention.”
This proliferation of initiatives does not guarantee that 
EU innovation policy will shift gear in the years to come, 
leading Europe back towards becoming a leader in research, 
development and innovation. The reasons why this is unlikely to 
happen are manifold, and include the following:
• A lack of a truly EU internal market for innovation including 
lack of a Community Patent, but even more importantly a 
lack of clear EU rules on technology transfer and a persisting 
lack of standardization. The fragmentation of performance 
in innovation is also a mirror image of the persisting absence 
of a real internal market for many of the most innovative 
sectors, including, most notably, the services sector. Financial 
markets are fragmented and the level of regulation and taxes 
varies across countries. While a degree of diversity is required, 
total lack of harmonization prevents cross-border venture 
capital investment and the creation of funds in areas where 
financing for innovation is needed. Furthermore, the obstacles 
to individuals’ mobility (in terms of taxation, portability of 
pension benefits, etc.) prevent professionals and businesses 
from reaching new markets and establishing their operations 
where opportunities are still unexploited. This calls for urgent 
action at the EU level to ensure that the free movement of 
capital and services are finally achieved.
 
 The Innovation Scoreboard 2010 has highlighted that EU 
member states can be divided into at least four different 
groups: (i) Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden all show 
a performance well above that of the EU27: these countries 
are the Innovation leaders; (ii) Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Estonia, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia and the UK are termed Innovation followers; (iii) 
the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia and Spain are below average in terms of 
innovation and are called Moderate innovators; (iv) finally, 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania perform significantly 
worse than average and are termed Modest innovators. At 
regional level, the situation is even more fragmented. The level 
of innovation in regions varies considerably across almost all 
EU countries. 
  Insufficiently targeted financial instruments for innovative 
SMEs: many of the financial instruments used by the European 
Investment Bank are unfit for the typical small company that 
wishes to market innovative products or services. In most 
cases, the minimum size of the loans that can be granted by 
the EIB or other institutions is too big for small innovative 
companies. This is a major problem, since it is statistically 
demonstrated that small companies are the ones that most 
often prove able to implement disruptive innovation in 
emerging markets.  
• The fact that innovation patterns have changed enormously 
in the past years, evolving toward “open innovation” and 
more regular cooperation between enterprises in the form 
of collective innovation efforts. As recently reported by the 
OECD, “the organization of innovative activities (technological 
as well as non-technological) across firm boundaries is clearly 
on the increase, with more balance between internal and 
external sources of innovation. Industries such as chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and information and communication 
technology8 (ICT) typically show high levels of open 
innovation.” 
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    Open innovation refers to the use of internal and external R&D 
sources; openness to external business models, a variety of IP 
generators and collaborations (SMEs, academics, etc.); and 
proactive IP asset management. This is leading to an increase 
in the number of companies collaborating in innovative 
activities. At EU level, this new concept poses a number of 
challenges, such as clarifying the scope and enforcement 
of IPRs to reduce transaction costs in creating collaborative 
networks; coordinating and tailoring public support schemes 
to reflect the evolving nature of innovative endeavors; and 
removing barriers to the circulation and licensing of ideas 
across EU Member States. The role of patents, technology 
transfer and standardization is key in this respect, as will be 
discussed below.   
Figure 6 
Traditional vs. open innovation
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• The fact that research, development and innovation 
(R&D&I) activities are increasingly internationalized, while 
innovation policy in the EU remains essentially national 
in scope. Available data shows an increased desire to have 
R&D closer to customers in foreign markets.9 Companies are 
internationalizing their research and innovation activities 
following two broad strategies: (i) an asset-exploiting strategy 
where firms seek knowledge about new markets to customize 
products and extend the expertise generated at home; and 
(ii) an asset-seeking strategy, whereby firms gather new 
knowledge and tap into the resources of a host country. 
 Examples of R&D internationalization include the creation 
of overseas R&D centers; alliances with local companies and 
universities; mergers and acquisitions of local firms; and 
increasing research intensity of foreign production facilities. 
In this context, data shows clearly that in international 
collaborations in ICT, US firms seem to be more active than 
EU ones: EU-Asia inventive collaboration in ICT R&D is still 
relatively low, while US-Asia collaboration is significantly 
higher than, particularly after 2000. In 2006, the Aho Report 
observed that the net imbalance of R&D investment by EU 
firms in the US compared with US firms in Europe increased 
fivefold between 1997 and 2002; and several major European 
firms no longer site new R&D initiatives in Europe.   
Figure 7 
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EU innovation: past mistakes, current prospects
• The fact that patterns of collaboration and research are 
gradually moving towards the online world. The emerging 
importance of “co-innovation” initiatives, which exploit 
the potential of social networking and mutually beneficial 
cooperation between individuals belonging to different 
groups, is a first important example of the potential of 
online collaboration tools in the IT era. What was previously 
considered as the unique advantages of physical proximity 
in R&D&I (such as sharing tacit knowledge) is now being 
entirely transposed in the online environment.10 As a result, 
co-innovation is seen as the next generation of a phenomenon 
that was previously termed “coopetition,” emerging along 
with the IT revolution.11 Also, traditional policies such as those 
on clusters and actions in support of industrial districts are 
heavily affected by this changing pattern of innovation. 
• The fact that innovation value chains are becoming 
increasingly complex. In an increasing number of markets, 
different complementary goods have to be assembled together 
to let end users benefit from the use of a product. These 
markets are often fraught with network externalities: the value 
of a product increases along with the number of its users, 
and along the number of applications or additional products 
that can be accessed through it. At the same time, service 
innovation has become as important as product innovation. 
Finally, the need to compete on a global scale has led to the 
growing importance of adopting a “value chain” approach, i.e. 
a holistic approach aimed at locating the weakest links in the 
value chain, and supporting them through dedicated policies.12 
• The persisting tendency to “pick the winners” that 
characterizes EU innovation policy in a number of fields, and 
especially in standardization policy. Quite often, EU policy 
has focused on supply-side support for specific technologies 
and markets: the EU seldom lets industry and consumers 
decide which products and technologies are likely to lead to 
the best outcomes for society. In this respect, there seems to 
be a lasting “GSM syndrome” in Europe, determined by the 
firm belief that harmonizing the 900 MHz spectrum band for 
the GSM technology in the late 1990s ultimately determined 
Europe’s leadership in the field of wireless telephony. The 
problem is that this industrial policy initiative has granted 
Europe a competitive advantage in the short term, but left 
the wireless market vulnerable to non-EU technologies as 
markets moved to 3G and now 4G phones: for example, in 
the Long Term Evolution, LTE, patent pool that is shaping 
the technology of 4G telephony, European companies have 
virtually disappeared.13   
13Next generation innovation policy
What innovation policy?
In the previous section, we have shown that the current 
“European gap” in innovation policy is likely to widen, regardless 
of how much of the EU budget is dedicated to innovation-related 
initiatives. The quality of innovation policy is clearly much more 
important than the quantity. For example, the EU spends more 
public money than the US in promoting research, development 
and innovation, R&D&I, but the overall result is poorer. This has 
an even more important consequence, outlined in a recent Task 
Force on Innovation Policy run by CEPS: there is a widening 
gap between the direction of public policy and the needs of the 
industry.
In addition, the current innovation landscape suggests that 
understanding the causes of the current “innovation gap” 
in Europe might well be a necessary step towards finding an 
adequate solution, but is not likely to be enough to restore 
Europe’s leadership in innovation. As markets, technologies 
and innovation constantly evolve, conceiving a forward-looking 
innovation policy for today’s economy makes very little sense 
– it would merely guarantee that the policy actions would be 
old and obsolete when finally implemented. On the contrary, a 
really “innovative innovation policy” requires that governments 
devote massive efforts to anticipating market developments by 
strengthening the dialogue with market players and enabling 
information sharing between private parties in order to gather 
information on market trends and future industry and consumer 
needs. 
At the EU level, additional problems emerge since: (i) new 
forms of innovation require an ever-growing scale, and the 
absence of a fully-fledged internal market does not guarantee 
scale; (ii) new forms of innovation require an holistic and 
collaborative approach, and EU innovation policy is not geared 
towards that approach; and (iii) speed is nothing, without 
control: a massive effort in the direction of funding R&D and 
innovation does not guarantee results if not coupled with 
well-targeted actions, the ability to meet industry demand, an 
approach geared towards filling the gaps in the value chain, and 
a more widespread reporting and monitoring of policy actions by 
public authorities. 
In this section, we look at the current policy mix adopted at EU 
and member state level on R&D&I, and then explore emerging 
policy alternatives for the 21st Century. 
I. The current portfolio of policy tools: a critical look
Perhaps the most important problem in shaping innovation policy 
around the world is the fact that innovation patterns change 
even more quickly for policy-makers, and by the time a new 
generation of innovation policy reaches the market, it is already 
obsolete. Current policies that seek to stimulate innovation are 
the result of what we understood about innovation since the 
1960s. These are mostly supply-side innovation policies, which 
look at the financing of new ventures by coupling public and 
private resources. Also, EU innovation policy is often fraught with 
untargeted supply-side initiatives, and only recently started to 
devote more attention to the demand side.
First, the greater part of EU initiatives in support of innovation 
relies on the use of financial instruments such as loans and 
grants, mostly managed by the European Investment Bank, 
which stands as the largest lender in the world (even larger 
than the World Bank), through the European Investment 
Fund. Over the past few years there has been a proliferation 
of these types of funding tools in support of R&D&I. Since the 
late 1990s, financial resources amounting to almost €1 billion 
have been provided by the EU budget under three successive 
programs, namely: the Growth & Employment Initiative (GEI) 
(€ 174 million during 1998–2001); the Multi-annual Program 
for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship (MAP) (€ 289 during 
2001–2006); and (iii) the current EIP I (€ 506 million during 
2007–2013). These resources are managed by the European 
Investment Fund (EIF) and are used to issue guarantees to 
credit institutions and, more commonly, counter guarantees 
to existing credit Guarantee Schemes (CGS). Based on these 
mandates, during 2009, the EIF issued a total of € 2.2 billion 
of guarantees. Additional resources for credit guarantee 
operations are provided by the Structural Funds. Part of these 
funds is managed by European Investment Fund (EIF) under 
the Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises 
(JEREMIE) initiatives. At the end of 2009, the value of the 
JEREMIE mandates devoted to credit guarantees was in the 
order of about € 770 million. The EIF has been very active in 
the SME Securitizations market, participating in more than 50 
transactions. EIF operations typically concern tranches of up to 
€50 million, consisting of investment grade portfolios (minimum 
rating BB), with an average life of 10 years. Finally, support 
to SME Securitizations can in principle be provided under the 
current EIP, through the Securitization Window, which however 
has so far remained non operational. Therefore, so far EIF 
has been operating exclusively on its own account, charging 
commercial rates. 
Similarly, EU support for the financing of innovation has been 
carried out through a variety of initiatives, including: (i) almost 
€1 billion already allocated to seed and start-up financing and 
technology transfer under the GEI and MAP (ETF Start Up, €324 
million); the GIF (€623 million) and the Technology Transfer 
Accelerator Pilot Project (€2 million); (ii) Initiatives financed 
under the Structural Funds; and (iii) resources managed by EIF 
on behalf of the European Investment Bank (EIB).
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What innovation policy?
Most of the budget available in the Competiveness and 
innovation program, CIP, is dedicated to the use of funding 
instruments such as equity funding and the risk sharing finance 
facility (RSFF), aimed at bridging the so-called “valley of death”: 
the latter tries to solve the typical problem faced by EIP tools in 
support for SMEs – i.e. the large size of loans, which is unfit to 
serve SMEs – by relying on credit lines set up with commercial 
banks that have a retailing role for SME financing. Figure 8 
below shows the major instruments available during the different 
phases of the life of SMEs and in particular for the so-called 
“valley of death” i.e. from the time when a start up firm receives 
an initial capital contribution to when it begin generating 
revenues.
Despite this proliferation of initiatives, today the number of SMEs 
facing problems in accessing bank financing can be estimated 
at between 2 and 3.5 million. Even assuming that only in 20% 
of the cases the difficulties experienced are not attributable to 
fundamental weaknesses but rather to the lack or insufficiency 
of collateral, the number of SME facing a financing gap can be 
estimated at between 400,000 and 700,000. This is a quite 
significant number, greater than the number of SMEs that 
benefited from the support of Credit Guarantee Schemes (CGS) 
in 2009, which, as indicated above, was a record year for credit 
guarantee activities.
Apart from the financial support for generic innovation activities, 
more specific types of innovation (e.g. eco-innovation, space-
related innovation, key enabling technologies) and specific 
types of innovators (e.g. SMEs), the competence held by the 
European Union in the promotion of innovation still appears 
rather limited, and heavily constrained by a rather strict 
application of the subsidiary principle. Currently, in a number of 
areas, the EU institutions cannot be very active in stimulating 
innovation, as their competence is limited to encouraging 
the exchange of leading practices and/or cooperation across 
borders. For example, in cluster policy, public procurement, 
key enabling technologies, eco-innovation and even venture 
capital the Commission most often has tied hands. On the 
contrary, innovation and key enabling markets crucially need 
supranational coordination and governance to work.
Figure 8
SME development and funding instruments
Source: Renda et al. (2006)
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The future evolution of Competiveness and innovation program, 
CIP, after the 2007–2013 multi-annual Financial Framework is 
likely to entail as many as 11 different lines of action: Financial 
instruments; the Enterprise Europe Network, Eco-innovation, 
Clusters and emerging industries, Public procurement for 
innovation, Key enablers: Technologies, ICT and Skills, Support 
for innovative SMEs, Space-related initiatives, SME support 
abroad, Tourism and Targeted actions for competitiveness.
II. Major obstacles towards a more innovative Europe
Looking at the areas of activity of EU innovation policy, and 
even neglecting the fact that financial instruments represent the 
greater part of all support activities, what emerges clearly is that 
supply-side policies are still the dominant way of engaging with 
innovation for public policy-makers in Europe. 
However, availability of public funds is probably the least 
important of the problems faced by European businesses seeking 
innovative research and innovation paths. Merely increasing 
public funding is unlikely to represent an option as the EU is 
already above the levels of public R&D funding on GDP observed 
in the US or Japan. At the same time, EU financial markets 
are mature enough to support innovative ventures when they 
have a potential market in Europe and beyond. Certainly, the 
fragmentation of EU financial markets hinders the development 
of well-developed and pervasive venture capital. However, 
European businesses face a set of important constraints, which 
go well beyond the mere availability of equity funds. For example: 
(i)  The lack of an internal market limits the incentive to develop 
new products, due to differences in technical standards, 
legal fragmentation and divergent conditions for market 
access; 
(ii)  The lack of clear and effective rules on technology 
transfer limits European firms’ potential to exploit Europe’s 
excellence in basic research; 
(iii)  The predominance of national interests in EU innovation 
policy limits the size of accessible markets and the 
possibility for European firms to engage in profitable cross-
border co-innovation initiatives, which would bring together 
the most productive and innovative European companies 
from all member states; 
(iv)  The lack of a comprehensive view of the innovation 
value chain leads policymakers to over-invest in funding 
instruments and under-invest in cheaper policy instruments 
such as demand-side policies. 
Besides failing to capture the demand-side potential of 
innovation policy, current tools also fail to adopt a business 
model approach to innovation. This, in turn, leads Europe to 
forego important opportunities. For example, in some cases 
public support that ultimately aims to favor SMEs should be 
directed at financial intermediaries, which are best placed to 
select the most innovative SMEs in which to invest. The absence 
of efficient and informed gatekeepers and investors is a chronic 
disease of the European economy. What’s needed is helping 
investors invest, rather than SMEs signalling themselves as more 
innovative than others. 
Finally, EU innovation policy is still insufficiently targeted at 
the services sector, which represents approximately 70% of the 
EU economy. Recently, the Expert Panel on Services Innovation, 
established by the European Commission and chaired by Allan 
Mayo, UK’s Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
released an insightful report recommending that the European 
Commission develops a European Service Innovation Center 
(ESIC) to strengthen the links between policy-makers, business 
and academia in the field of services innovation. The ESIC would 
act as a central hub of expertise, and would support the activity 
of a proposed High Level Group on Business Services, which 
the European Commission proposed to establish in its recent 
document “An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalization 
Era: Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre 
Stage.” Importantly, the Expert Panel’s report looks at specific 
types of services that significantly contribute to the framework 
conditions in which business activity takes place. These are 
major drivers of innovation as they potentially change the way 
in which innovation is achieved by businesses. These so-called 
“transformative services” include:14
• Networking, connecting and brokerage services which link 
consumers, firms and supply chains and improve the allocation 
and distribution of goods and information in society
• Utilities and infrastructure services, such as telecoms, energy 
and waste disposal, that increasingly provide higher value-
added services for their customers
• Knowledge Intensive Business Services (KIBS) that 
collaborate closely with their customers to help upgrade their 
technology, organizational processes, and business models as 
well as transfer knowledge and experience across sectors
Growing emphasis on these types of services is highly consistent 
with the idea that EU innovation policy should take a more 
“value-chain-oriented” approach and improve the conditions for 
innovation to flourish in European universities, research centers, 
businesses, public administrations and even among customers. 
Based on these insights, it is time to broaden the mindset of 
policymakers: innovation policy should take a holistic approach; 
it is currently too one-sided, too supply-sided, too narrow, not 
efficiently multi-level, obsolete, and too slow. 
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Towards innovative innovation policy
The previous sections have highlighted that EU innovation 
policy needs to be updated to fully consider industry needs and 
evolving market trends at a very early stage of formulation. 
Possible ways to accomplish this goal include the following: 
1  Use ongoing consultation of industry stakeholders 
through permanent platforms.  
New technologies that can be used to enable this ongoing 
exchange include the use of expert panels and wiki-
government; public clearing-houses; and prediction 
markets.15 These initiatives would help policymakers 
establish policy directions and prioritize interventions 
and industrial policy actions in order to achieve the most 
effective results. Currently “obscure” concepts such as key 
enabling technologies (KETs) could be updated over time in 
light of these exchanges of information; and, more generally, 
policy-makers would have the possibility of adding “control” 
to speed, by securing the possibility to fine-tune their policy 
actions on the basis of market developments, and target 
their actions in order not to waste public money, or deploy 
public funding where private investment is possible and 
likely. 
2  Enable more effective technology transfer in Europe. The 
empirical literature reveals an outstanding lag between the 
US and Japan on one hand and Europe on the other hand, 
in technology and knowledge transfer, especially between 
universities and industry. The causes are manifold, but 
essentially reside in the need for a less fragmented internal 
market (i.e. a larger potential demand for university-driven 
innovative products), more legal certainty and a business 
environment that is more conducive to co-investment. One 
option might be to transform the role of the government 
to that of mere “command and control” regulator to that 
of “facilitator” of private-private partnerships and “Co-
innovator” in the context of public-private partnership 
(see #5 below). In addition, governments can enable 
more effective technology transfer by creating innovation 
platforms and promoting open and interoperable 
environments to the benefit of all SMEs (see #4 below). 
Finally, governments have the more general task of 
creating an environment that is conducive to a speedy and 
frictionless trading of technology and information - i.e. 
reducing, to the extent possible, transaction costs to boost 
private exchange and sharing of intellectual property and 
technology. 
3  Exploit the wealth of networks.  
As observed in the past years by scholars such as Harvard 
Professor Yochai Benkler, networks have become the 
dominant way of producing innovation in a number of 
sectors, where creativity and cooperation have become 
much more important than capital markets and competition 
as key drivers of innovation. Currently, EU innovation 
policy does not rely on the concept of network, but rather 
on financial support of the promotion of geographically 
concentrated clusters. However, the information revolution 
seems to be departing from the concept of cluster to 
embrace a wider model of networks of clusters or networks 
of innovators, which share part of their R&D and exploit 
network externalities and economies of scale when 
marketing their products. The EU27 is the ideal setting 
for working on networks, and past experience in research 
policy (for example, FP7 cooperation projects) has shown 
that, when carefully managed, R&D&I networks can bring 
important results.
4  Invest in innovation platforms.  
Innovation policy meets industrial policy whenever emerging 
platforms are considered as a whole, and the business case 
for investing in those platforms is taken as the starting 
point to develop policy strategies. The growing importance 
of multi-sided markets in industries dominated by 
standardization suggests that whoever is able to solve the 
“chicken and egg” problem typical of multi-sided markets 
wins the game. Policymakers should look at markets 
according to their inherent economics, before they decide 
to regulate them or to intervene through untargeted policy 
actions.
5  Facilitate co-innovation.  
Co-innovation has emerged as a way to extend the scale and 
scope of external partnerships and alliances to access and 
exploit new technologies, knowledge and markets. This term 
has also recently been used to refer to cases in which clients 
cooperate in the development of innovation, communicating 
their needs and specific requirements so that they are 
factored into the R&D process at an early stage.  
Co-innovation labs have been established by companies 
especially in emerging economies, where they are able to 
establish important contacts with local markets in order to 
gain a competitive edge in hugely attractive countries such 
as China, India and Brazil. At the same time, co-innovation 
was used by some governments as a form of PPP for 
innovation, as was the case in Singapore last year, with the 
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launch of the Public-Private Co-Innovation Partnership (CI 
Partnership), a platform for the Singapore Government 
and local companies to co-develop innovative approaches to 
meet government needs. 
  The central idea behind the CI Partnership is that 
“Government can better serve the public through 
innovations borne out of public-private partnership.” 
Singapore companies can also grow their innovation 
capability in the process, while building a valuable track 
record at the same time. For the development of promising 
innovation ideas – from conceptualization to implementation 
– the Government provides more than $1.75m in funding for 
each company at three critical stages. 
  Funds are also available for projects involving demonstrating 
Proof of Concept, projects demonstrating Proof of Value and 
projects involving test bedding of prototypes. For each of 
these, the CI partnership entails that companies co-share a 
small part of the cost to ensure that they have a stake in the 
project, with SMEs getting greater support compared with 
non-SMEs.
6  Strengthen demand-side policies.  
The times of “governments as obstacles” should be put to an 
end. Governments can stimulate innovation in many ways, 
creating unprecedented opportunities for European markets. 
These include, most notably, the use of pre-commercial and 
early-commercialization procurement, which can help make 
the most of a sector (public procurement) that accounts for 
as much as 17% of the EU economy. The US and Japan have 
already shown how profitable use of demand-side policies 
can boost innovation.
7  Innovative financial instruments.  
As already mentioned, the proliferation of various types of 
financial instruments, from credit guarantee schemes to the 
RSFF and equity funds did not succeed in unleashing the 
potential for innovation in Europe to date. More targeted 
financial instruments are likely to be decisive in this 
respect, and include, among other things IP-backed finance, 
cooperation between governments and commercial lenders 
to develop standards for the use of intangible assets as 
collateral. Allowing IP to be used as collateral will increase 
the amount of funds a company, such as one in the high-
tech sector, would qualify for. 
8  Unleash the hidden power of PPPs.  
Public private partnerships have proven at once beneficial 
and risky in Europe in the past. The variety of contractual 
schemes and governance modes that can be put in place has 
led to an inefficient allocation of risks and the undesirable 
use of public funds for services and investment that could 
have been provided by private parties only. Efficient PPPs 
today are needed for all those enabling technologies that 
are supposed to generate positive externalities that will not 
be internalized by the private investor.
9  Rethinking subsidiarity.  
In a globalized world, where superpowers speak of joining 
forces towards common interests, the fact that innovation 
policy is still prey to national interests in Europe sounds 
increasingly odd. While US, Indian and Chinese companies’ 
team up to link their research efforts and create world 
leading products, the European Commission is still 
struggling to retain some power in cluster policy or in 
stimulating innovation networks. In most cases, Europe can 
only enable the sharing of leading practices and, of course, 
give money. 
10 Improve the governance of EU innovation.  
Last but not least, the governance of EU innovation policy 
must be carefully revisited. Although the second Barroso 
Commission has sought to streamline governance, there 
seem to remain important margins for improvement, not 
only in terms of subsidiarity, but also in terms of consistency 
between actions adopted at the EU level, in order to add 
consistency and coherence to EU actions in support of 
innovation.  
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Government 2.0:  
anticipating society’s needs
In recent years, scholars and public administration experts 
have frequently spoken of an upcoming “Government 2.0” 
era, in which citizens can be involved not only as taxpayers 
and customers of public services, but as co-creators and co-
regulators, thanks to the use of modern services to stimulate 
the participation of individuals in public policies. In the United 
States, for example, Barack Obama announced in his first 
speeches as President that his objectives included creating a 
more open government (“A clear commitment changing the 
way government works with its citizens: government should be 
transparent, participatory and collaborative”.) The former Head 
of the Open Government Initiative in the Obama administration, 
Professor Beth Simone Noveck, inspired this transition with the 
definition of Wiki Government.16
In a recent article, Hilgers and Piller (2011) define Government 
2.0 as the combined effect of four concomitant revolutions: an 
economic revolution (Wikinomics); a technology revolution 
(Web 2.0); a social revolution (social networking) and a 
demographic revolution (the Net generation, or the generation 
of “digital natives”).17 These four forces call on national 
governments and the EU to revisit the ways in which they 
interpret their role towards citizens and also businesses.
The same authors highlight that new ideas and insights into the 
directions public policy should take are already being drawn from 
citizens in a growing number of cases. For example, the City of 
Boston has developed its own iPhone App, establishing a useful 
bilateral channel to communicate with citizens. Big initiatives 
such as RebootBritain have confirmed that also in the UK the use 
of the web and “crowdsourcing” techniques to empower citizens 
and administrations is more than simply a promise. Examples 
are becoming countless also in Europe, and especially in the UK, 
where citizens’ participation in local public policy has become 
widespread through initiatives such as askbristol.com, the 
Birmingham’s “Open City” project. Another exemple is the Berlin-
Lichtenberg participatory budgeting initiative.  
If these options can be implemented to enable the participation 
of citizens to public policy, why shouldn’t they be applied to 
innovation policy? The secret might lie in providing innovative 
businesses, researchers and citizens with a common platform 
aimed at exchanging ideas and technological solutions to better 
identify society’s needs. Co-designing policies, co-delivering of 
results and co-evaluating existing policies are possible avenues 
of reform for an administration that is traditionally (and so far, 
almost inevitably) distant from civil society such as the European 
Commission. 
Figure 9
Forces that transform government
Source; Hilgers and Piller (2011)
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This possible channel of communication is even more 
promising as the European Commission is investing in the 
creation of a public “cloud” and on a European strategy for 
Cloud computing.18 In this context, the European Commission 
could organize contests for developing applications that improve 
public services in the years to come. As reported by Hilgers  
and Piller (2011), during the contest “Apps for Democracy,” 
47 software programs entered the platform within 30 days: 
with prize money amounting to USD 50,000, software 
development expenses of more than USD 2 million were saved 
(www.appsfordemocracy.org). This is crowdsourcing: an open, 
constant, creative competitive dialogue for the development of 
innovative services through collective intelligence.  
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Next generation technology transfer
Technology transfer has traditionally been one of the key engines 
of innovation in industrialized countries, especially where 
education systems are well developed, and universities produce 
a wealth of innovative solutions through basic and applied 
research. In Europe, knowledge and technology transfer between 
university and industry is still a missing link in the innovation 
value chain. Among the factors that have hindered the 
development of university-industry partnerships and academic 
spinoffs, the most evident are the absence of an entrepreneurial 
culture in many European universities, the lack of a full-fledged, 
pan-European patent and the limited development of innovation 
markets and intermediaries. 
In the US, royalties from licensed inventions pay more than 3% 
of universities’ research bill, while in the UK it is only 1%, and in 
many European countries much less. US institutions such as the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, MA, started 
licensing patents back in the 1940s, and the 1980 Bayh-Dole 
Act has boosted the creation of technology transfer institutes in 
US universities. While in 1972 there were only 30 universities 
with a dedicated institute for tech transfer, in 2003 they were 
more than 300. The issue of promoting more technology and 
knowledge transfer in Europe is even more crucial since the 
commercialization of innovation and the promotion of venture 
capital are evident, urgent problems. And tech transfer is 
particularly needed in key enabling technologies, such as 
photonics and nano-technologies, where universities hold the 
core of the scientific knowledge that could be usefully applied 
at the industrial level. The time is ripe to discuss an EU-style 
Bayh-Dole Act, tailored to the needs of European universities and 
industry. Accordingly, the European Commission has announced 
an ad hoc communication on the future of technology transfer 
and the European Research Area for June 2011. 
But the problem of technology transfer is not only related to 
the mere exchange of IPRs and information between university 
and industry. Academic spinoffs and direct licensing to young 
innovative companies crucially need a fully functioning 
ecosystem, which includes the promotion of venture capital and 
the emergence of open innovation intermediaries. Innovation 
intermediaries are actors specialized in the articulation and 
selection of new technology options; in scanning and locating 
of sources of knowledge; in building linkages between external 
knowledge providers; and in developing and implementing 
business and innovation strategies (Bessant & Rush 1995; 
Howells 2006; Lopez-Vega 2009.) 
In particular, recent work by Diener and Piller (2011) usefully 
refers to the role of emerging actors defined as Open Innovation 
Accelerators (OIA), i.e. innovation intermediaries that operate 
on the behalf of organizations seeking to innovate in cooperation 
with external actors from their periphery. Their mission is to 
bridge structural disconnected knowledge pools caused by the 
lack of diversity within a firm. OIAs offer one or several methods 
of open innovation (e.g, idea contests, broadcast search, co-
creation toolkits) and complementary services for the innovation 
process. 
In short, OIAs engage in scanning and gathering information, 
and facilitating communication and knowledge exchange. But 
next generation technology transfer needs the creation of 
innovation platforms and hubs, where intermediaries can operate 
in search for valuable new ideas and opportunities, closing the 
gap between universities and industry. The form of those new 
platforms and hubs is discussed in the next section. 
Figure 10
Open innovation accelerators
Source: Piller (2011) 
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From markets to platforms,  
networks and hubs
Traditional innovation models are based on the idea of markets 
and firms. The market economy has determined the emergence 
of complex, internalized value chains in which the R&D activity 
of firms took place mostly as an intramural set of tasks. The 
need to preserve trade secrets or the technical information and 
tacit knowledge embedded in patented products has been the 
driving force of this development, with businesses replacing the 
risks and transaction costs of market exchanges with hierarchies 
in which information and knowledge was kept within the 
boundaries of the firm (Williamson 1975).
Alternative governance mechanisms that emerged in the past 
century could also entail the participation of a multitude of firms. 
However, this was mostly a “one-to-many” type of governance, 
with a single undertaking retaining control over the whole 
value chain and related industrial results. Even in IT industries, 
at the outset, prevailing business models were based on the 
externalization of certain functions, but always tied to non-
disclosure agreements. 
Today, the development of new technologies, the prominent 
role of network externalities in many innovation markets, the 
advent of Web 2.0 and the increasing sophistication of industrial 
customers and households have made those business models 
obsolete. Even in traditional innovation-intensive and patent-
intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals, companies have 
embarked in a radical transformation of their business models. 
And the role of the government, from that of regulator and 
enforcer, has become increasingly one of “facilitator” and  
“co-innovator”. 
In order to fully exploit the potential of new technologies, it 
is necessary to move from a concept of “market” to a more 
value-chain-oriented approach. Economic theory has begun 
to move away from the concept of market when Michael Porter 
introduced the idea of “cluster policy”, drawing also on existing 
industrial realities, such as that of industrial districts in 20th 
Century Italy. Porter’s ideas were ground-breaking for innovation 
economics and policy. Today, it is widely acknowledged that 
the cluster form has a very important impact on transaction 
costs and knowledge-sharing, and can prove very important for 
innovation and competitiveness, skill formation and information, 
growth and long-term business dynamics. A recent study 
published by the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings 
emphasizes the potential of clusters run by well grounded 
strategies to accelerate sustainable growth and employment.  
Figure 11 below shows the positive relationship between 
employment in clusters and GDP per capita for regions of 
Europe.
Given that 38% of European employees work in industries that 
concentrate regionally, clusters are extremely important for the 
EU economy. Recent studies have found that companies that 
belong to industry clusters achieve greater productivity and 
innovation, and those new firms that belong to clusters exhibit 
higher survival rates and growth19. 
Despite the fact that Porter’s ideas have permeated innovation 
policy in many EU member states, there is evidence that 
Europe is lagging behind other regions of the world in terms 
of the dynamism of clusters and the organization of a full-
Figure 11
Clusters and prosperity
Source: European Commission, Innovation Clusters in Europe: A statistical analysis and overview of current policy, 2007.
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From markets to platforms, networks and hubs
fledged cluster policy. Specifically, clusters – defined as regional 
agglomerations of co-located industries and services – are too 
fragmented and need to be consolidated in order to emerge as 
true competitors with other world regions. 
The European Commission is today heavily committed to help 
achieving world-class clusters in the EU:20 however, so far 
subsidiarity constraints have limited the possibility for Europe to 
successfully stimulate and foster the emergence of such global-
scale clusters. More centralization at the EU level, today, would 
certainly enable a more efficient and effective cluster policy. 
Economists and industry experts seem to agree on one fact: 
geographical proximity belongs to the past of cluster policy, 
while modern clusters are community-driven, not geography-
based. As reported in a recent study by Cisco (2011), modern 
clusters and so-called “innovation hubs” should be characterized 
as “digital communities of interest, cohering through close 
intellectual proximity, and not solely through geographic 
proximity,” also due to the growing power of online social 
networks and collaboration tools in the business sphere.21
But this is only part of the story. Besides becoming more 
community-driven and increasingly digital, clusters are 
also heavily affected by the changing structure of certain 
markets, and the complex dynamics of competition in many 
industries. Many new markets, including those for new enabling 
technologies and transformative services, are characterized by 
the following features:
• Modularity: products are composed of several “complementary 
units”, often produced by different companies, which must 
interoperate to enable use of the product. In many cases, there 
is a need to pool different patents and other IPRs (intellectual 
property rights) in order to enable the creation and marketing 
of those products.
• Interoperability. The increasing complexity of value chains in 
many markets and the modularity of modern system goods 
lead mostly to the predominance of incremental innovation 
over disruptive innovation. “Innovating together” is a lot easier 
whenever businesses and researchers share common themes 
and objectives, something that can be achieved only through 
innovation platforms.
• Complexity/convergence. The challenge in many markets is 
to merge inventions and technological solutions developed 
for sectors that were previously separate. Ideally, the cluster 
of the future may merge competences and skills developed 
in different areas of specialization, and different geographic 
regions.  
The consequences of the changing nature of clusters for EU 
innovation policy are dramatic. Several governments have 
already understood the potential of creating communities 
conducive to joint innovation and sharing of ideas on priorities 
and technological solutions by government, industry, clients, 
academia and citizens. 
• In the UK, the Technology Strategy Board (TSB) was 
established at the end of 2004 to ensure the technology and 
innovation priorities for the UK reflected business needs and 
had a clear market focus leading to wealth creation. To support 
this approach, in November 2005 the TSB introduced the 
concept of Innovation Platforms, i.e., a new way of working 
for Government and business that is seen as an opportunity 
to generate more innovative solutions to major policy and 
societal challenges. The TSB is currently investing, along 
with business and public sector partners, in five Innovation 
Platforms: (i) assisted living; (ii) low carbon vehicles;  
(iii) intelligent transport systems and services; (iv) low 
impact buildings; and (v) network security. Over the next 
three years the UK government plans to introduce a further 
five Innovation Platforms, in areas that address other major 
societal challenges.22 
• In the United States, innovation platforms have been put 
at the center of the Obama administration’s innovation 
program. The 2011 Strategy for American Innovation 
specifically cites the need to “catalyze innovation hubs and 
encourage development of entrepreneurial ecosystems,” 
looking for new opportunities to bring talented scientists and 
entrepreneurs together to support innovation in cutting-edge 
areas. This concept underlies the Department of Energy’s 
Energy Innovation Hubs program and is also driving the 
Startup America initiative’s focus on building connections 
between established and new entrepreneurs, including those 
making the leap from lab to industry.23 Several innovation 
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platforms have been created in recent years also by 
universities to bridge the gap between academia and industry, 
civil society and government. For example, MIT’s Innovation 
in Informational health (IIH) platform has partners in the 
United States, Nicaragua, Honduras, Peru, Tanzania, India and 
Pakistan. Figure 12 below shows the model adopted by the 
IIH: the Accelerated Product Development (APD) framework 
(shown at far left) is informed by the collaborative innovation 
and takes those research ideas into hands-on projects. The IIH 
APD can take an idea from inception, into medical feedback, 
through clinical feasibility studies and trials and provide 
assistance in funding. 
• The concept of innovation platforms is also being adopted 
at EU level, in particular through the work of the European 
Institution of Innovation & Technology (EIT). Since 2010, 
the EIT has worked intensively on the creation of a number of 
Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs), which are 
de facto innovation platforms characterized by co-location 
of innovation centres, and a multitude of interconnected 
communities. In December 2009, the first three KICs were 
launched in the fields of Climate Change Mitigation and 
Adaptation (Climate-KIC); Sustainable Energy (InnoEnergy) 
and Future Information and Communication Society (EIT ICT 
Labs). One example of the types of players involved and the 
geographic coverage throughout the territory of the EU, is 
InnoEnergy KIC. The community involves 13 companies, 10 
research institutes and 13 universities. Half of the partners 
are from the industry, and the KIC features strong connections 
with the industry and venture capitalists. 
The initiatives launched by the EIT are indeed promising, 
because they also take a pan-European perspective in a setting 
in which national prerogatives tend to prevail over an otherwise 
obvious case for centralization. With a strengthened EU 
legal framework for venture capital, cross-border investment 
and dispute resolution, Intellectual Property protection and 
university-industry partnerships, these types of knowledge 
communities can really bring Europe to higher levels of 
competitiveness. 
Figure 12
MIT’s IIH platform
Source: MIT
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Harnessing the power  
of demand-side policies
Recently, President Obama announced that he has directed 
“agencies to purchase 100% alternative fuel, hybrid, or electric 
vehicles by 2015”, in order to reduce the environmental impact 
of the federal fleet. By doing this, the US Government will also 
stimulate innovation in the field of green vehicles. 
This is a perfect example of how governments can stimulate 
innovation by acting not only as facilitators and regulators, but 
also as customers in need of new products and services. By 
expressing their needs for innovative products and solutions, 
governments can become engines of new investment and the 
application of innovative technological solutions. As stated i.a. by 
the Aho report in 2007, demand-side innovation policy is at once 
the most promising and the most under-represented approach in 
EU innovation policy. The EU2020 strategy and, in particular, the 
Innovation Union flagship initiative, contains some elements of 
demand-side policy, but a lot more seems to be needed to make 
public procurement an engine of innovation and growth. 
Europe should also boost public procurement of innovative 
solutions, in particular through pre-commercial procurement. 
Public procurement in the EU represents around 19.4% (€2,200 
billion) of the EU’s GDP. Public authorities have a substantial 
purchasing power that they could use to stimulate innovation. 
However, in contrast to other countries, only a few innovations 
are supplied or demanded by public procurers in Europe. In 
Japan, a long tradition of demand-side policy is now being 
consolidated in the 4th Science and Technology plan, which is 
mostly based on the idea of prioritization of R&D for sustainable 
development and the creation of Innovation Platforms. In the 
US, public procurement – including through the Small Business 
Innovation Research initiative (SBIR) – plays a substantial role 
both in developing technology and providing innovative solutions 
to societal challenges if they cannot be addressed with existing 
products and services. The US public sector procurement of R&D 
is about 20 times bigger than in the EU. However, it should be 
noted that a large amount of the US public sector procurement 
of R&D relates to defence and space budgets.
Public procurement is insufficiently used to stimulate innovation 
in Europe for several reasons. These include the wrong incentives 
(procurers tend to favor low cost, low risk solutions); lack of 
knowledge and capabilities of public procurers; no strategy 
that links public procurement with public policy objectives (e.g. 
health, environment, transport) and research, development and 
innovation (R&D&I) support initiatives (typically grant funded); 
fragmentation in demand; barriers to access to public contracts 
as SMEs cannot cope with public procurement at the first stage, 
they often act as subcontractors. This hampers the access of 
public authorities to the innovative potential of SMEs, who play a 
key role in creating innovations and innovative solutions. 
Figure 13
Innovation policy: taxonomy of measures
Source: Orange (2010)
Public procurement networks and LMI
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to enter new and fast growing global markets and (ii) to 
facilitate the faster uptake of new products, services and 
technologies. The six lead markets chosen were sustainable 
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clothing and equipment, bio-based products, recycling, eHealth 
and renewable energy. These markets are highly innovative, 
provide solutions of broader strategic, societal, environmental 
and economic challenges; and have a strong technological 
and industrial base in Europe. Under the LMI, three public 
procurement networks became operational in September 2009:
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• The Sustainable Construction and Innovation Network 
(SCI-NETWORK) brings together a strong group of 
public authorities and other key stakeholders wishing to 
drive sustainable innovations in public construction and 
regeneration projects across Europe. The network hopes to 
help combat the cross-border fragmentation of the sector and 
ensure the spread of good ideas. Specific working groups will 
focus on three topics: renovation of existing building stock, 
innovative building materials, and the use of life-cycle analysis 
(LCA) and life-cycle costing (LCC).24
• The Low Carbon Building (LCB) – healthcare network 
will create a platform for a network of public procurement 
stakeholders that wish to be proactive in stimulating innovative 
low-carbon building solutions for the health care sector. A 
platform for a network of public procurement stakeholders 
that wish to be proactive in stimulating innovative low-carbon 
building solutions for the healthcare sector will be created. 
Demonstration pilots will take place in all consortium countries 
aiming at collating, testing and developing further the tools 
created and enabling the spread of leading practices.25
• ENPROTEX seeks to spark innovation of protective textiles 
through public procurement to meet the future needs of 
fire and rescue services using a number of methodologies 
including; establishing and sustaining a specialized platform 
of European Network of Public Procurement Organizations; 
developing cooperation among public procurers; providing 
an interface with both end-users and manufacturers. In 
particular, the project will aim to provide industry with forward 
commitments for the procurement of protective textiles 
products to encourage innovation in the sector.26
The SBIR experience
In the 1980s, the US launched the Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) and Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI), 
which focus on using the procurement of public authorities 
to foster R&D and innovation. The main objectives are to 
stimulate technological innovation, to use small business to 
meet federal R&D needs, to foster and encourage participation 
in technological innovation by minorities and disadvantaged 
persons, and to increase private sector commercialization 
of innovation derived from federal R&D. These initiatives are 
especially targeted at SMEs and offer a way of connecting 
innovative new enterprises with public authorities to explore 
new ideas and bring forward technologies and services. Public 
authorities run a competition for innovative ideas, and winning 
Figure 14
Pre-commercial procurement: a scheme
Source: European Commission (2008)
*GPA = Government Procurement Agreement
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Harnessing the power of demand-side policies
enterprises receive contracts (not grants) for R&D. The UK and 
the Netherlands developed SBIR/SBRI-initiatives based on the US 
SBIR policy, which has the longest history.
Since 1982, 17,500 enterprises have been involved with US 
SBIR for an amount of USD 27 billion. The projects have resulted 
in 68,000 patents and more than USD 36.5 billion of additional 
equity. Almost half of the SBIR projects that passed through the 
two phases of the selection have reached the market.
In 1999, Joshua Learner of Harvard Business School compared 
500 companies that had received SBIR contracts with 900 
matched companies which hadn’t and concluded that the SBIR 
firms had created five times as many jobs over a 10 year period. 
In regions with high levels of entrepreneurial activities, such 
as Silicon Valley and Boston, the difference was 17 times. An 
analysis of companies receiving National Science Foundation 
contracts tells a similar story.
In the UK, a similar initiative was established in 2001 and had a 
very slow start because only a few departments adopted it. In 
fact, the SBRI wasn’t successful in the period 2001–2008 for 
a number of reasons, including lack of focus on innovation in 
spending departments, but also lack of legal certainty as regards 
the need to apply EU procurement or state aid legislation. In 
2008, the UK SBRI was remodelled in a way that resembles more 
the US SBIR. 
The Netherlands introduced a twofold SBIR-like scheme, one 
departmental SBIR and one managed by the Netherlands 
Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO). Eighty 
project ideas from TNO have been put forward within the 
Dutch SBIR, which resulted in 299 requests for background 
information. In total, 142 proposals for feasibility studies were 
submitted, of which 27 were carried out, and 10 successfully 
moved on the next phase of R&D. So far, only four have been 
completed. Out of the total number of companies that put 
forward a proposal, 95% were SMEs. In 2010 a first evaluation 
of the Dutch SBIR was carried out, mostly as regards the project 
selection process, with overall positive and reassuring results. 
Green Public Procurement
One area where public procurement can prove decisive for the 
future of European competitiveness is certainly eco-innovation, 
part of which is the so-called “green public procurement.” This is 
defined at the EU level as “a process whereby public authorities 
seek to procure goods, services and works with a reduced 
environmental impact throughout their life cycle when compared 
to goods, services and works with the same primary function 
that would otherwise be procured.”27 Areas where green public 
procurement is being launched at EU level include “white goods” 
(energy-efficient refrigerators, ovens, washing machines 
and tumble dryers); components (high-efficient motors); 
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housing (energy-efficient water mixer); office blocks (control 
and monitoring systems, sun shading technology and lighting 
system); public transportation (hydrogen buses); the transport 
sector (hydrogen powered fuel cell, electric car, electric 
motors, city buses); wastewater treatment (environmental 
biotechnology); chemical components (DEHP-free component); 
healthcare products (e.g., continence care products); and 
energy-efficient components (pumps).
So far, available studies have shown that using public 
procurement in support of eco-innovation can bring substantial 
benefits to the EU economy, such as a 25% reduction in CO2 
emissions from certain activities, with no significant additional 
financial burdens for the taxpayers.28 However, once again 
the lack of an internal market is hampering the attempts of 
the European Commission in the direction of a strong uptake 
of green procurement in the EU27. Some countries speak 
of “sustainable procurement,” whereas other countries are 
aligned with the EU definition of “green” procurement; and 
other countries have not defined any strategy in this respect. 
Furthermore, countries use different taxonomies of products 
and different “green” criteria, making it very difficult to compare 
national experiences and coordinate the advancement towards 
reaching environmental policy goals. Finally, attempts to steer 
the EU toward green public procurement have so far focused on 
a limited set of products. 
Beyond traditional procurement: the promise of prizes
Besides incorporating innovation and other policy goals in the 
procurement process of EU public administrations, there is much 
more that governments can do to stimulate innovation in the 
procurement process. As observed in the previous sections, 
crowd sourcing practices can be used effectively during the 
procurement process for public services, especially when 
coupled with prizes and awards. The use of these tools has 
increased enormously in the past years. Recently, the UK 
government has announced a £1 million prize for the  
best technology platform proposed by citizens that would  
be able to tackle “common problems.” In April 2010, the US 
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 
began requesting public input on how to implement President 
Obama’s innovation strategy, under the slogan “Government 
does not have a monopoly on the best ideas.” A website called 
challenge.gov was developed to host all government challenges 
that could be solved by citizens and stimulate participation.  
But many other websites already exist. As an example, NASA 
scientists trying to devise a formula for predicting solar flares 
decided to post their problem online and offered a USD 30,000  
prize to anyone who could solve it. The contest was posted on 
InnoCentive.com, and out of 579 examiners a retired radio 
frequency engineer from New Hampshire won the prize.
Examples are countless: The European Commission has also 
been experimenting with stable consultation platforms such as 
“Your Voice in Europe,” but these initiatives have so far seldom 
pushed themselves towards the creation of a real collaboration 
between the private sector and government in the development 
of innovative solutions to tackle socially relevant problems. This 
is, in our opinion, the next step in several countries around the 
world. As recalled also recently by a report of the European 
Internet Foundation “Digital World in 2025,” the future that can 
be envisaged is one of mass collaboration, in which consumers 
become producers (or “pro-sumers”) and governments and 
businesses open up their boundaries and production processes 
to citizens and civil society. After all, we have already seen 
disruptive innovation coming from mass collaboration efforts 
and community-driven innovation such as open source software 
products and creative commons licensing. 
Recently, the launch of the “Social Innovation Europe” initiative 
in March 2011 was encouraging. The use of mass collaboration, 
“government as a platform” concepts and “government as a 
customer” concepts has permeated the European Commission’s 
plans for social innovation in a way that promises interesting 
developments.
In the future, crowd sourcing and similar variants will become 
a more important way of conceiving innovative solutions, and, 
most importantly, for societal challenges faced by EU’s ageing 
and increasingly multi-cultural society. This is why achieving 
broadband penetration throughout the European Union as 
quickly as possible is becoming a priority. Investing in key 
infrastructure is the first turning point of modern innovation 
policy. Europe has no time to wait for competition to lead to 
long-term investment when it comes to modern communications 
technologies. The time is already ripe to go beyond consultation 
and centralize innovation-related crowd sourcing into a common 
EU platform. Every day spent waiting for investment in high-
speed broadband is a day of delay in the global context for 
innovative solutions, competitiveness and growth.
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Views from industry stakeholders 
Results of a survey among industry experts,  
scholars and civil servants
In the past sections, we have explored possible ways to improve 
EU innovation policy by finding new ways to involve stakeholders 
in the dialogue on the future direction and priority of innovation 
policy. In light of this approach, we surveyed a limited number 
of industry experts, scholars and civil servants to gather 
their perceptions on where EU innovation policy should be 
improved in the years to come. The focus has been towards 
the view of industry stakeholders who have innovation as part 
of their agenda. In order to get a timely and recent input, we 
performed this task during a number of events held at CEPS 
during February–March 2011, as well as by disseminating 
a questionnaire (see the Annex to this Report) to CEPS 
Corporate Members, a number of industry association at EU 
level (Businesseurope) and in some member states (The 
Netherlands, Italy, Sweden). We have collected 54 responses, 
which provide a first set of views on the main problems perceived 
by stakeholders with respect to EU innovation policy. 
Figure 16 below shows the percentage of respondents that 
either partly or fully agreed with the proposed questions. As 
shown in the figure, the questions that met the strongest favour 
of the respondents were the need to focus on innovation and 
skills and the need to use PPPs in support of deployment of 
enabling technologies such as broadband. At the same time, 
a number of key questions were answered positively by the 
respondents.  
In particular, the following results can be highlighted:
• 96.3% of respondents agree that university-industry 
partnerships and technology transfer should be further 
stimulated in Europe. Looking at the current state of 
knowledge and technology transfer in the European Union,  
the fact that this statement was one of the mostly agreed in 
our survey may not be unexpected. 
Figure 16
Percentage of respondents who agreed with the questions (all 54 respondents)
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• 92.6% of respondents think that EU and national 
governments should do more to create demand for 
innovation. This confirms the need to move towards stronger 
use of demand-side innovation policy, in line with what we 
have envisaged in the previous sections. Another related 
result of our survey is also the fact that 74.1% of respondents 
considered that public procurement should be used to created 
demand for innovation. 
• 92.6% of respondents also think that industry stakeholders 
should be consulted on a regular basis and as a permanent 
measure. This, as we have remarked in the previous pages, 
can be seen as a useful way to collect views on industry 
needs and organize innovation policy in a more targeted way. 
This view is also partly matched by the fact that 74.1% of 
respondents considered EU innovation policy has failed to fully 
match industry needs. 
• 88.9% of respondents are in favour of stronger coordination 
of innovation policy at the EU level. Innovation policy is seen 
as too fragmented at national level. This view is in line with the 
idea that subsidiarity should be reconsidered when it comes to 
innovation policy. If one considers that 81.5% of respondents 
replied that EU innovation policy should be thoroughly 
reformed, there seems to be room to advance ground-breaking 
changes in the way innovation is promoted in Europe. At the 
same time, the centralization of EU policy at the EU level and 
the creation of an EU agency have met with less support on 
the side of respondents. It therefore seems that coordination, 
even more than centralization, is the most supported option 
for the future of EU innovation policy. 
• 81.5% of all respondents think that EU innovation policy has 
been so far too focused on competition, and not enough on 
providing investment incentives. 
• However, the expansion of traditional innovation tools such 
as fiscal incentives was subject to a broader disagreement 
among the respondents. Perhaps this could be an indication 
that these tools are considered to be only partly effective in 
promoting real innovation, due to the fact that they have been 
in use for a long time in the European Union, and with limited 
results.  
In addition, the great majority of respondents think that a 
community patent would foster more innovation for SMEs, 
and that EU innovation policy should focus on key enabling 
technologies and services. 
Figure 17 below shows the breakdown of our respondents.
Figure 17
Breakdown of respondents (n = 54)
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Annex I: Questionnaire
This questionnaire has been designed for the purpose of collecting industry views on the future directions that public policy 
should take in order to stimulate innovation and progress in European countries. We highly value your ideas and your time: 
accordingly, we have designed a short set of 20 questions for you to answer. Should you have more time to dedicate to the 
questionnaire, we would highly appreciate if you could express your views also in the text box we have included in Part III. 
PART I – LOOKING BACK
1. Innovation Policy in the EU has failed to fully match industry needs
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
2. Innovation Policy in the EU should be thoroughly reformed
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
3. Innovation Policy in the US and Japan is more effective than in the EU
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
4. EU policy so far has focused too much on competition, and not enough on investment incentives
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
5. EU policy is too fragmented, and needs more coordination 
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
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PART II – LOOKING FORWARD
6.  Europe needs forms of permanent consultation of industry stakeholders to identify industry needs  
and act accordingly
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
7. EU innovation policy should focus on key enabling products/services
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
8.  Tax incentives should be used more frequently to stimulate the supply of innovation (e.g. through 
tax credits)
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
9.  Fiscal incentives should be used more frequently to stimulate the demand for innovative products 
(e.g. through tax exemptions or rebates for consumers of new technologies)
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
10.  EU and national governments can do more to create demand for innovation 
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
11.  Innovation policy should be more centralized at the EU level
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
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Annex I: Questionnaire
12.  Public procurement should be used to create demand for innovative products and services
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
13.  Lack of labour mobility is a key obstacle to EU competitiveness
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
14.  Europe needs to strengthen IP-backed finance for SMEs (i.e. financing of innovation that relies on 
patents as a collateral)
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
15.   Europe’s innovation policy should encourage more university-industry partnerships and 
technology transfer
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
16.   Public-private partnerships should be used to accelerate the deployment of enabling technologies 
such as broadband networks
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
17.  EU innovation policy should focus on education and skills 
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
18.  A Community patent would foster more innovation for SMEs
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
19.  There should be a dedicated EU agency for innovation
 I fully disagree  I partly disagree  I partly agree  I fully agree  Not sure
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PART III – YOUR VIEWS
20.   Below, you can express your suggestions for the future of EU innovation policy in Europe, with neither limits 
nor space constraints 
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Annex II: results of our survey
Results for all respondents
 Full 
disagree, %
Partly 
disagree, %
Partly 
agree, %
Fully 
agree, %
Not sure, 
%
Total, %
1. Innovation Policy in the EU has failed to fully match industry needs 0.0% 18.5 55.6 18.5 7.4 100 
2. Innovation Policy in the EU should be thoroughly reformed 3.7 11.0 44.4 37.0 3.7 100
3.  Innovation Policy in the US and Japan is more effective than  
in the EU
0.0 7.4 25.9 48.1 18.5 100
4.  EU policy so far has focused too much on competition, and not 
enough on investment incentives
3.7 11.1 51.9 29.6 3.7 100
5. EU policy is too fragmented, and needs more coordination 0.0 11.1 18.5 70.4 0.0 100
6.  Europe needs forms of permanent consultation of industry 
stakeholders to identify industry needs and act accordingly
0.0 7.4 22.2 70.4 0.0 100
7. EU innovation policy should focus on key enabling products/services 3.7 14.8 44.4 33.3 3.7 100
8.  Tax incentives should be used more frequently to stimulate the 
supply of innovation (e.g. through tax credits)
0.0 22.2 33.3 40.7 3.7 100
9.  Fiscal incentives should be used more frequently to stimulate the 
demand for innovative products (e.g. through tax exemptions or 
rebates for consumers of new technologies)
7.4 18.5 25.9 33.3 14.8 100
10.   EU and national governments can do more to create demand for 
innovation
0.0 0.0 18.5 74.1 7.4 100
11.  Innovation policy should be more centralized at the EU level 3.7 33.3 37.0 22.2 3.7 100
12.   Public procurement should be used to create demand for innovative 
products and services
11.1 7.4 29.6 44.4 7.4 100
13.  Lack of labour mobility is a key obstacle to EU competitiveness 7.4 25.9 33.3 25.9 7.4 100
14.  Europe needs to strengthen IP-backed finance for SMEs (i.e. 
financing of innovation that relies on patents as a collateral)
0.0 11.1 29.6 37.0 22.2 100
15.   Europe’s innovation policy should encourage more university-
industry partnerships and technology transfer
3.7 0.0 22.2 74.1 0.0 100
16.   Public-private partnerships should be used to accelerate the 
deployment of enabling technologies such as broadband networks
0.0 0.0 51.9 48.2 0.0 100
17.  EU innovation policy should focus on education and skills 0.0 0.0 51.9 48.1 0.0 100
18.  A Community patent would foster more innovation for SMEs 0.0 0.0 25.9 55.6 18.5 100
19.  There should be a dedicated EU agency for innovation 11.1 11.1 37.0 25.9 14.8 100
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Results for business respondents only
 Full 
disagree, %
Partly 
disagree, %
Partly 
agree, %
Fully 
agree, %
Not sure, 
%
Total, %
1. Innovation Policy in the EU has failed to fully match industry needs 0.0 6.7 66.7 13.3 13.3 100 
2. Innovation Policy in the EU should be thoroughly reformed 6.7 13.3 46.7 26.7 6.7 100
3.  Innovation Policy in the US and Japan is more effective than  
in the EU
0.0 0.0 26.7 46.7 26.7 100
4.  EU policy so far has focused too much on competition, and not 
enough on investment incentives
0.0 6.7 46.7 40.0 6.7 100
5. EU policy is too fragmented, and needs more coordination 0.0 13.3 26.7 60.0 0.0 100
6.  Europe needs forms of permanent consultation of industry 
stakeholders to identify industry needs and act accordingly
0.0 6.7 20.0 73.3 0.0 100
7. EU innovation policy should focus on key enabling products/services 6.7 20.0 40.0 33.3 0.0 100
8.  Tax incentives should be used more frequently to stimulate the 
supply of innovation (e.g. through tax credits)
0.0 20.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 100
9.  Fiscal incentives should be used more frequently to stimulate the 
demand for innovative products (e.g. through tax exemptions or 
rebates for consumers of new technologies)
13.3 20.0 20.0 33.3 13.3 100
10.   EU and national governments can do more to create demand for 
innovation
0.0 0.0 13.3 73.3 13.3 100
11.  Innovation policy should be more centralized at the EU level 6.7 26.7 26.7 33.3 6.7 100
12.   Public procurement should be used to create demand for innovative 
products and services
13.3 6.7 20.0 53.3 6.7 100
13.  Lack of labour mobility is a key obstacle to EU competitiveness 13.3 13.3 40.0 26.7 6.7 100
14.  Europe needs to strengthen IP-backed finance for SMEs (i.e. 
financing of innovation that relies on patents as a collateral)
0.0 6.7 33.3 33.3 26.7 100
15.   Europe’s innovation policy should encourage more university-
industry partnerships and technology transfer
6.7 0.0 20.0 73.3 0.0 100
16.   Public-private partnerships should be used to accelerate the 
deployment of enabling technologies such as broadband networks
0.0 0.0 40.0 60.0 0.0 100
17.  EU innovation policy should focus on education and skills 0.0 0.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 100
18.  A Community patent would foster more innovation for SMEs 0.0 0.0 33.3 46.7 20.0 100
19.  There should be a dedicated EU agency for innovation 13.3 20.0 26.7 26.7 13.3 100
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